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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15904 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action seeking to have the statute authorizing 
annexation of appellant's property to Centerville City declared 
unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted respondent Robert B. Hansen's 
Motion to Dismiss and held that Section 10-2-401, Utah Code 
l1i111otcitcd 1953, as enacted by the Laws of Utah 1977, is 
constjlutiunal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
order and a determination by this court that the statute 
authorizing annexation of ~ppellant's property to CenterviU 
City is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Appell 
agrees that Centerville City has proceeded in accordance wU 
Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as recodified 
in 19 77, to anne:~ his property into the city thereby subject 
his property to taxation by Centerville City. The constit~ 
tionality of said statute is the sole issue involved in 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS ENACTED BY THE LAWS OF UTAH 
1977, IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The appellant claims that Section 10-2-401, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 48, Section 2, 
of the Laws of Utah 1977, deprives him of his property with· 
out due process of law by not requiring notice to and an 
election of the landowners involved in annexation proceeili~ 
Said Section 10-2-401, which is very similar to its repeal~ 
predecessor Section 10-3-1, provides as follows: 
-2-
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Whenever a majority of the owners of 
real property and the owners of at 
least one third in value of the real 
property, as shown by the last assess-
ment rolls, in territory lying contiguous 
to the corporate boundaries of any 
municipality, shall desire to annex 
such territory to such municipality, 
they shall cause an accurate plat or 
map of such territory to be made 
under the supervision of the municipal 
engineer or a competent surveyor, and 
a copy of such plat or map, certified 
by the engineer or surveyor as the 
case may be, shall be filed in the 
office of the recorder of the munici-
pality, together with a written petition 
signed by a majority of the real 
property owners and by the owners of 
not less than one third in value of 
the real property, as shown by the last 
assessment roles, of the territory 
described in the plat or map; and the 
governing body of the municipality, at 
a regular meeting shall vote on the 
question of such annexation. The mem-
bers of the governing body may by 
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, 
accept the petition for annexation, 
subject to the terms and conditions 
as they deem reasonable, and the terri-
tory shall then and there be annexed 
and within the boundaries of the muni-
cipality. If the territory is annexed 
a copy of the duly certified plat or 
map shall at once be filed in the 
office of the county recorder, together 
with a certified copy of the resolution 
declaring the annexation. The articles 
of incorporation of the municipality 
shall be amended to show the new 
territory annexed to the municipality 
and a copy of the articles of amendment 
shall be filed with the secretary of 
state and county clerk or clerks in 
the same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108. 
On filing the maps, plats and articles 
of amendment, the annexation shall be 
deemed complete and the territory annexed 
shall be deemed and held to be part of 
the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants 
thereof shall enjoy the privileges of the 
annexation and be subject to the ordinances, 
resolutions and regulations of the annexing 
municipality. 
-3-
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Except for the inclusion of the additional requirement 
pertaining to one-third of the value of the real property 
in 1957, the foregoing statute has provided for the 
initiation of annexation proceedings by a written petition 
of a majority of the real'property owners since 1898. 
A general statement of law applicable to the 
legislative powers pertaining to annexation is set forth in 
56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, §55, with numerous 
supporting cases, as follows: 
In the absence of constitutional 
limitations, it is generally considered 
that the power of a state legislature 
over the boundaries of the municipalities 
and counties of the state is absolute and 
that the legislature has power to extend 
the boundaries of a municipal corporation, 
or to authorize an extension of its 
boundaries, without the consent of the 
inhabitants of the territory annexed, or 
the municipality to which it is annexed, 
or even against their express protest. 
To the same effect is Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 
(5th Edition), §355, page 617. 
A more specific statement of the constitutionali~ 
of annexation statutes which do not provide for the consent 
of, and notice to, the inhabitants of annexed areas there-
under is contained in 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations 
It is well settled that the legislature m~ 
not only originally fix the boundaries or 
limits of a municipal corporation, but, subject 
to constitutional restriction, may subsequentli 
annex, or authorize the annexation of, conti~ 
or other territory without the consent or even 
against the remonstrance of persons residing 
therein. Annexation of land by the legisla~ 
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withuut assent of or notice to the inhabitants 
is not a denial of due process. And it 
follows that notice by publication does not 
violate the due process requireraents of the 
federal and state constitutions. Indeed, 
the state f",ay authorize the extensIODOf the 
territorial area of a municipal corporation with 
or without the consent of the citizens or even 
against their protest, unrestrained by ani 
provision of the Federal Constitution. 
Dut while the legislature has the power to pro-
vide for, or authorize, the annexation of 
territory without the consent of the inhabitants 
residing therein, it may, and usually does, 
provide for such consent as a condition of 
annexation. Inasmuch as the legislature may 
provide for the annexation of territory to 
municipal corporations without the consent of 
the inhabitants of the annexed territory, 
the inhabitants cannot complain of any 
limitations upon their ability to express their 
disapproval if the legislature sees fit to 
make the statute conditional upon its 
acceptance by the affected territory. Thus, 
if the annexation of a small municipal cor-
poration to a large one is made conditional 
upon its acceptance by a majority of the 
voters of the two municipal corporations 
taken together, the citizens of the smaller 
one cannot complain although their vote is 
overpowered by that of the larger one; nor 
is it any ground for objection that the right 
to vote upon the acceptance of the act is 
limited to the taxpaying electiors of the 
territory which it is sought to annex, or, 
still less, that it is left to those possessing 
the suffrage at general elections, so that 
owners of taxable property in the annexed 
district having no right to vote, such as 
nonresidents and corporations, have no voice 
in the matter. And a statute permitting 
contiguous territory to be brought into a 
municipality on the vote of the majority of 
the electors within the municipality only 
is constitutional. (Emphasis added). 
A leading case in support of the foregoing auth-
orities is Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 151, 
28 S. Ct. 40, which involved a Pennsylvania statute permitting 
the cunsoljddtion of a smaller city with a larger city upon 
-5-
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the approval of a majority of the votes cast in both citi~ 
at an election called for that purpose, even though a maj~ 
of the votes in one of the cities opposed it, as occurred 
in the consolidation of the cities of Pittsburgh and All~~ 
The United States Supreme Court, in sustaining the constit~ 
tionality of the statute, capsulized the holdings of many 
cited cases as follows: 
***It would be unnecessary and unprof-
itable to analyze these decisions or quote 
frora the opinions rendered. We think the 
following principles have been established 
by them and have become settled doctrines 
of this court, to be acted upon wherever 
they are applicable. Municipal corporations 
are political subdivisions of the state, 
created as convenient agencies for exercisi~ 
such of the governmental powers of the state 
as may be intrusted to them. For the purpose 
of executing these powers properly and 
efficiently they usually are given the 
power to acquire, hold and manage personal 
and real property. The number, nature, and 
duration of the powers conferree upon these 
corporations and the territory over which 
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute 
discretion of the state. Neither their 
charters, nor any law conferring govern-
mental powers, or vesting in them property 
to be used for governmental purposes, or 
authorizing them to hold or manage such 
property, or exempting them from taxation 
upon it, constitutes a contract with the 
state within the meaning of the Federal 
Constitution. The state, therefore, at its 
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such 
property, hold it itself, or vest it in 
other agencies, expand or contract the 
territorial area, unite the whole or a 
part of it with another municipalityr repeal 
the charter and destroy the corporat1on. 
All this may be done, conditionally or 
unconditionally, with or wit~out the.consent 
of the citizens, or even against the1r 
protest. In all these respects the state 
is supreme, and its legislative body 
-6-
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conforming its action to the state consti-
tution, may do as it will unrestrajned by 
any provision of the Constitutjon of the 
United States. Although the inhabitanti 
and property owners ma~ by such changes, 
suffer inconvenience, and their pro ert 
may be lessened in value by t e burden of 
increased taxation, or for any other reason, 
they have no right, by contract or other-
wise, in the unaltered or continued existence 
of the corporation or its powers, and there 
is nothing in the Federal Constitution which 
protects them from these inJurious consequences. 
The power is in the state, and those who 
legislate for the state are alone responsi-
ble for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it. 
Applying these principles to the case 
at bar, it follcws irresistibly that this 
assignment of error (permitting the voters 
of the larger city to overpower the voters 
of the smaller city) , so far as it relates 
to the citizens who are plaintiffs in error, 
must be overruled." (Emphasis added). 
For a case supporting Hunter v. Pittsburgh and setting forth 
several cases in Iowa which have consiste~tly held that 
failure to provide for any notice and hearing on the question 
of annexation of territory to a municipality does not deprive 
owners of their property without due process of law, see 
City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 250 Iowa 457, 93 N.W. 2d 216, 
appeal dismissed 359 u.S. 498, 3 L.Ed. 2d 976, 79 S. Ct. 1118, 
in which the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded: 
If, as we have held, extension of municipal 
boundaries without assent of or any notice 
to the inhabitants is not a denial of due 
process, certainly annexation upon publjshed 
notice does not have that result. 
In one of the Iowa cases cited in the ~case, Wertz v. 
Ottumwa, 201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511, it was held that a gen-
eral statute authorizjng the council of a city or town by 
resolution to incorporate into the city or town any adjoining 
-7-
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platted territory did not deprive the mmers of the added 
territory of their property without due process of law, 
stating their conclusion thusly: 
We think that a failure to provide for a 
notice and h~aring on the question of 
annexation does not render the statute 
unconstitutional. The legislature had power 
to provide by law how municipalities shall 
be incorporated, and also how their boundari~ 
may be extended. The legislature did not ' 
transcend constitutional limitations by the 
statute in question, in failing to provide 
that the question of annexation of territory 
to an existing municipality must be submitted 
to a vote of the people interested therein. 
In the absence of constitutional limitations 
to the contrary, the legislature may by 
statute provide for the extensic~ of the 
boundaries of a municipality without the 
assent of the inhabitants of either the 
municipality or the territory to be annexed. 
(Citing cases.) 
The statute is not unconstitutional 
because no notice of the proposed annexation 
was given to appellants and because the 
question of anne:cation was not subrni tted 
to a vote of the electors of the annexed 
territory. 
In Lenox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 137 Ky. 484, 125 S.W. 1089, 
on rehearing 127 S. W. 538, writ of error dismissed 231 U.S. 
739, 58 L.Ed. 461, 34 S. Ct. 317, it was held that a statute 
which provided for the extension of municipal boundaries by 
an ordinance of the city council did not violate the const~ 
tutional provision against taking property without due pro~ 
of law, or without just compensation, although the notice 
required by the statute was insufficient to warn persons 
whose property was annexed. The Court of Appeals of Kentud 
stated as follows: 
If the constitutional provision protect~~ 
property owners from being deprived of their 
-8-
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Proper~y without due process of law, or fron 
having their property taken without just 
compensation, applied to the annexation of 
territory, the position of counsel for 
appellants would be well taken. But it has 
been repeatedly announced, by this court 
and others, that the question of due process 
of law or the taking of property without 
compensation has no application to the annexation 
of territory to a municipality. The extension 
or reduction of the boundaries of a city or 
town is held, without exception, to be purely 
a political matter, entirely within the power 
of the legislature of the state to regulate. 
The established doctrine is that the state 
legislature has the unlimited right to pass 
such laws for the annexation of territory 
to municipal corporations as in its judgment 
will best accomplish the desired end, and 
that a different method may be provided for 
each class. It may, if it chooses, direct 
that notice shall be given personally to 
each individual owner of property sought 
to be annexed, or that notice by publication 
shall be given, or that notice by posting copies 
of the ordinance at any place shall be sufficient, 
or it may provide that no notice at all need be 
given. In short, the manner of annexation is 
entirely beyond the power of the courts to 
control if the provisions of the statute are 
followed. (Citing cases.) 
In City of Tucson v. Garrett, 77 Ariz 73, 267 P. 2d 717, 719, 
the Supreme Court of Arizona held as follows under an annexation 
statute substantially similar to that of Utah providing that 
on presentation of a petition signed by the owners of not 
less than one-half in value of property in any contiguous 
territory, the city may by ordinance annex such territory 
upon filing with the county recorder copies of the ordinance 
with an accurate map of the territory annexed: 
In analyzing this statute, an enunciation 
of some of the well-established rules appli-
cable to the addition of territory to munici-
palities, and the legislative power in connection 
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therewith, is apl-'ropriate. The extent of 
the right of municipalities to enlarge their 
boundaries is dependent entirely on the 
legislature and its power in that respect is 
plenary in the absence of constitutional 
limitations, and there are none affecting 
t~e problem.h~rei~ .. The legislature may 
give to mun1c1pal1tJes the power to annex 
territory upon any condition it chooses to 
impose, either with or without the wishes 
of the inhabitanls of the territory involved 
either with or without notice to anyone, ' 
with or without the right of objecting 
inhabitants to protest.*** 
(Emphasis added) . 
The law in the State of Utah is in accord with 
the foregoing authorities. In the exhaustive and well-
reasoned case of Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 U. 368, 
57 P. 1, the question presented for determination was 
whether the legislative acts establishing the boundaries 
of the city and authorizing municipal taxation thereof weu 
vi0lative of state and federal constitutional provisions in 
that such statutory enactments authorized taxation, for ci~ 
purposes, of lands lying outside the platted and improved 
portion of the city, and used only for agricultural purposa 
After reviewing many cases and authorities the court, in 
unanimously holding that it is th~ legislature's prerogat~ 
not that of the judiciary--to provide for municipal 
boundaries and the taxation thereof for municipal purposes, 
quotes from Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark case of 
McCulloch v. Maryland and then follows at page 5 of the 
Pacific Reporter: 
***In Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 562, 
the same cmi nent jurist observes: "The 
power of legislation, and consequently of 
taxation, operates on all the persons and 
-10-
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property belonging to the body poljtjc. This 
is an original principle, which has its 
foundation in society itself. It is granted 
by all for the benefit of all. It resides 
in thP government as part of itself, and need 
no~ b~ reserved where property of any des-
cr1 pt1on, or the right to use it in any 
manner, is granted to individuals or cor-
porate bodies. However absolute the right 
of an individual may be, it is still in the 
nature of that right that it must bear a portion 
of the public burdens; and that protion must 
be determined by the legislature. This 
vital power may be abused, but the interest, 
wisdom and justice of the representative 
body, and its relations with its constituents, 
furnish the only security against unjust and 
excessive taxation, as well as against unwise 
legislation." Accepting this as sound doctrine, 
as we safely may, would not the judicial 
department itself be guilty of transcending 
its constitutional power were it to inquire 
into the expediency, wisdom, or justice of 
the legislation in question in this case? 
Would not this department likewise transcend 
its power if it would undertake to inquire 
into the conditions and facts on which the 
legislature acted in creating the municipality 
of Grantsville City, fixing the boundaries, 
and providing for the raising of revenue to 
maintain the municipal government and defray 
its expenses, and then substitute our judg-
ment as to the sufficiency of such conditions 
and facts to warrant the legislation, which 
has resulted in the imposition of the tax 
complained of, for that of the legislature? 
Yet this is substantially what we are asked 
to do. This, in itself, would be an abuse, 
because it would be a usurpation of power 
by one department of the government which 
the people absolutely vested in another. 
In further elucidating upon the exclusive province of the 
legislature in matters of municipal expansion and taxation, 
the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval from other cases 
on matters particularly apropos to the present inquiry: 
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In Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, whe 
the limits of a city were extended so as ton 
include agricultural land, Mr. Justice Mille 
delivering the opinion of the court, said: r, 
"It is not denied that the legislature could 
rightfully enlarge the boundary of the city 
of Pittsburgh so as to include the land. If 
this power were denied, we are unable to s~ 
how such denial could be sustained. h'hat 
portion of a state shall be within the limib 
of a city, and be governed by its authoriti~ 
and its laws, has always been considered to 
be a proper subject of legislation. How 
thickly or how sparsely the territory within 
a city must be settled is one of the matters 
within legislative discretion. Whether territ 
shall be governed for local purposes for a 
county, a city, or a township organization, 
is one of the most usual and ordinary subject! 
state legislation." And, again, he said: 
"It may be true that he does not receive t~ 
same amount of benefit from some or any of 
these taxes as do citizens living in the heart 
of the city. It probably is true, from the 
evidence found in this record, that his tax 
bears a very unjust relation to the benefits 
received as conpared with its amount. But 
who can adjust with precise accuracy the 
amount which each individual in an organized 
civil coIT.munity shall contribute to sustain 
it, or can insure in this respect absolute 
equality of burdens, and fairness in their 
distribution among those who must bear the~ 
We cannot say judicially that Kelly receiv~ 
no benefit from the city organization." *** 
So, in Washburn v. City of Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 
453, 19 N.W. 364, Mr. Chief Justice Cole said: 
"It may be unwise, even unjust, to include 
within the limits of a city or village lands 
used for agricultural purposes, and inpose 
upon them the additional burdens of such 
municipalities. But where is the remedy? 
Certainly not in the courts. Confessedly,, 
the legislature has power, under the consti-
tution, to provide for the organization of . 
cities and incorporated villages, which carne 
with it the power to fix the territorial boo~ 
aries of such public corporations. If the 
legislature sees fit to include agricultural 
lands within its boundaries, what right have 
the courts to control or review that legis-
lat1 ve discret1on? Can the courts say to the 
legislature it must not annex this territoi;r 
-12-
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or that to the municipality; that it has not 
ample power to prescribe the extent of the 
city or village limits? It seems to us a 
veFY plain proposition that such matters 
rest entirely within the discretion and 
under the control of the legislature." 
(Emphasis added.) 
After recognizing that Article XIII, Section 5, of the 
Utah Constitution expressly prohibits the legislature from 
imposing a tax for municipal purposes on property within any 
city but authorizes it to empower local government to do 
so, and that under Section 10 of that same Article XIII all 
property, real and personal, located "within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax," is subject to 
taxation for municipal or other reasons, the court concluded: 
***When, therefore, as in the case at bar, 
a city has been incorporated, and a local 
government established, such government is 
an "authority" to levy a tax. There is no 
limitation as to the extent of the "territorial 
limits" of a municipality or taxing district, 
and therefore, as we have noticed, the fixing 
of the boundaries of a cit or taxing district, 
and amount of area it shall contain, is w o y 
a matter of legislative discretion, and the 
exercise of such discretion is not a subject 
of judicial investigation or revision. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the court specifically 
overruled the prior cases of Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18 
U. 163, 55 P. 386, and People v. Daniels, 6 U. 282, 22 P. 
159, the latter being a territorial case decided before 
statehood and the adoption of the state constitution in 
which the court held that the territorial legislature's 
extension of municipal boundaries may constitute the taking 
0f privat~ property for public use, contrary to the Fifth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution, if the exten. 
Slr 
is unreasonable and embraces territory used only for agricu] 
tural or horticultural purposes. In this respect, the co~ 
in the Kimball case speci..fically held that ArU cle I, Secti• 
22, of the Utah Constitution--"Private property shall not~ 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.". 
is not a limitation on the taxing power of the state but 
is a limitation on the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain. 
It is thus apparent that the appellant's citati~ 
of statutes of sister states, as well as our own territor~ 
laws, only sustains the posi ti.on of the respondents herein, 
namely that annexation and the imposition of municipal tum 
upon annexed properties is solely a matter of legislative 
determination which may provide for notice to, and consent 
of, the inhabitants of the annexed area, the annexing ci~, 
or both, but may also authorize such extension without 
notice to or consent of the inhabitants and even against 
their express protest, all without contravening state or 
federal due process requirements. The provisions of the 
Utah law on municipal annexation fall in the middle area 
of the foregoing spectrum by requiring the initiation of 
annexation proceedings, not by the municipality, but by t~ 
written petition of a majority of the affected landowners 
representing at least one-third of the assessed value of 
the area seeking annexation. The fact that the legislature 
of some states have chosen different procedures for municip 
annexations than others is no basis for declaring the law 
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of one or the other of those states unconstitutional. The 
legislative enactments of the State of Utah stand on their 
own n1erit, not on the collective judgment of another state's 
lawrr.akers. 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that 
Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted in 
1977, is constitutionally valid and the order of dismissal 
of the appellant's complaint by the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES 
AND THE IMPOSITION OF MUNICIPJl.L TAXES 
UPON ANNEXED PROPERTY IS A LEGISLATIVE 
MATTER. 
The respondent incorporates herein the argument 
as set forth under POINT I. The Utah legislative enactment 
under attack by the appellant has not been shown to be 
violative of either the federal or state constitutions and, 
therefore, should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Although one is in~ressed with the research and 
energy that has gone into the appellant's efforts to guard 
against that which he envisions as a threat to his concepts 
of justice and individualistic well-being, it js most 
app~r0nt that his resourcefullness and honest endeavor have 
nr_)t_ supplant-ed his need of col'lpetent legal assistance. 
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As much as we may agree with appellant's reproach of 
increasing governmental paternalism as a prelude to diet~~ 
ship and slavery at the hands of those who should be servinr 
as watchmen on the towers of ~estern civilization, the ei~ 
year-old statutory procedure for annexation in Utah hardly 
seems to be the focal point of such an insurrection. Jud~ 
intervention into the legislative arena for determining 
such matters would be far more violative of the principles 
of government enunciated by our founding fathers. The order 
of the lower court should be affirmed and by so doing, 
Centerville City will be enriched by the inclusion of a 
true son df liberty in her electorate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General of the Statecl 
JACK L. CRELLHJ, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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